THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX:
FORM AND MEANING IN THE PROLOGUE OF HERODOTUS*

For Benedetto Bravo

Abstract: The paper focuses on Herodotus' authorial self-representation, and on the problem of the intellectual tradition and genre(s) behind the *Histories*. The main assumption is that the opening sections of the work are a natural place to present its subject and principles to the public. Despite and beyond the notoriously loose grammatical structure of the first sentence, this paper offers a formal analysis of the whole 'extended preface' (*incipit* through 1.5.4), a carefully organized large-scale 'pedimental composition'. A detailed examination of this structure yields the following results: (1) the stories about the abductions of women form an ironic attack against a peculiar model of causality of some contemporary Greek poets and writers, whose pragmatic outlook deprives the world of its ethico-religious dimension. (2) Conversely, Herodotus himself propounds a symbolic view of the world and seeks a monistic principle encompassing the past and the whole range of human experience. He ultimately finds it in the idea of the 'cycle of human affairs'. This idea is the carefully stated subject of the *Histories*. (3) Although he belongs to the agonistic and display-oriented intellectual world of the sophistic era, Herodotus poses as a 'sage' capable of penetrating the whole variety of 'all things'. Thus, he refers his reader to the tradition of wisdom literature. (4) Not unlike Thucydides, Herodotus' research into the greatest military conflict thus far forms in his view the best possible paradigmatic diagnosis of the human condition – much better than that of his fellow wise men (poets, philosophers, etc.) because based on the firm ground of verifiable historical data. (5) Although Herodotus is intent upon seeing the world from the standpoint of a single organizing principle, one of the most salient features of the *Histories* is the notion of the 'marvellous' (*thômaston*), which clearly elicits the pragmatic or factual attitude of the thinkers he dislikes. Many problems we experience when interpreting this author are due to the tension between the two attitudes. (6) This inherent breach in Herodotus' mind should be seen as a result not of a development or evolution of his work and thought, but of the contemporary debate between two diametrically opposed types of knowledge, *viz.* between the exponents of *polymathiê*, or *Vielwisserei*, and those of *sophiê*, or 'wisdom'. Herodotus' contemporaries active in the field of *arkhaiologia* (including mythography, genealogy, etc.) and *periêgêsis* (geography, ethnography, etc.) were widely considered 'polymaths'. Herodotus' ambition to apply the monistic (and symbolic) bent of wisdom literature to the subject-matter dominated thus far by the 'pluralistic' (and pragmatic) way of thinking was at least partly responsible for this discontinuity in his thought, but also accounts for the originality of the *Histories*.

I. INTRODUCTION

At the very beginning of his remarkable essay on Tolstoy's view of history, Sir Isaiah Berlin defines two diametrically opposite categories of writers and thinkers. On the one hand are those who reduce everything to a single universal and all-encompassing principle; on the other, those who aim at diverse goals, not necessarily subsumed by any moral or aesthetic rule. Based on a famous fragment of Archilochus (*fr.* 201 West (*IEG*²): πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ, ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα),[1] he calls them respectively 'hedgehogs' and 'foxes'. Berlin's Plato, Proust and Dostoyevski are hedgehogs; his Aristotle, Balzac and Pushkin, foxes. Rather unsurprisingly, his Herodotus is a fox too.

I resort here to Berlin's categorization not only because it so well expounds a widely accepted view of Herodotus' work. Interestingly, we find a comparable antithesis already in the Presocratics. In one of his fragments (22 B 40 DK), Heraclitus opposes the πολυμαθίη, or

[1] For a probable meaning of the fragment, *cf.* Ion of Chios, *TrGF* 1, *fr.* 38, and Plin. *HN* 8.133 *ad fin.* (or perhaps 8.134 *init.*?), with C.M. Bowra, *CQ* 34 (1940) 26-9.

Vielwisserei[2] of some of his predecessors and contemporaries (Hesiod, Xenophanes, Pythagoras and Hecataeus) to (his own) wisdom or mind (νοῦς).[3] It is tempting to parallel this with his *fr.* B 1 DK, where he confronts his knowledge and his teaching concerning the Logos with the lack of understanding of other humans.[4] Twice we find the same opposition between πολυμαθίη and νοῦς (or πολυνοίη) in Democritus (68 B 64 and 65 DK).[5]

I would assume that this antithesis bears witness to a debate between two fundamentally different modes of thought.[6] Although Heraclitus and Democritus give a partisan vision of πολυμαθίη, the opposition itself seems not unfounded. Even on a formal level, as Benedetto Bravo ((2001) esp. 84-9) has recently shown, there is much in common between the style of some poems of the Cyclic epics and that of some sixth- and early fifth-century narrative and descriptive works in prose (genealogical, historical and periegetic, such as those of Hecataeus, Acusilaus and Pherecydes). Their common denominator, according to Bravo, is an underlying 'pragmatic' way of thinking, strikingly contrasting with that of the earliest Greek poetry. Unlike Homer and Hesiod, the exponents of this attitude are not interested in the ethico-religious (and therefore symbolic) aspect of the world. They conceive the data of everyday experience, as well as those of poetry or of oral tradition, exclusively from the standpoint of factuality (true or fictitious), as a homogenous set of things or objects devoid of deeper meaning, but interesting nonetheless and capable of provoking curiosity.[7] I think that the criticism of πολυμαθίη by Heraclitus and Democritus can best be explained as a hostile reaction of representatives of an opposite mode of thinking to the said intellectual trend (*cf.* below, pp. 159-61).

It seems that, for Heraclitus and Democritus, the most important difference between πολυμαθίη and real knowledge or wisdom is that the latter tends to perceive the whole world ('all things') as 'one' (ἓν πάντα (εἶναι), Heraclit. *fr.* B 50 DK; cf. *fr.* B 41), while the former concentrates on the variety and diversity of the world. Furthermore, it is important to note that, at least for Heraclitus but most probably for Democritus too, the debate concerns not only the content of the wise man's teaching (see, e.g., the Logos of Heraclitus), but also the procedures or techniques involved in acquiring this wisdom, such as ἱστορίη, or 'inquiry', attributed to Pythagoras in a (spurious) fragment (B 129 DK) of Heraclitus.[8]

[2] For the 'pluralistic' aspect of knowledge in early Greek thought, see esp. Snell (1924) 65-8 and *idem, JHS* 93 (1973) 180. Henceforth, I define *polymathiê* as a general disposition of mind or a certain way of thinking, *pace* Guthrie (1962-9) 1.417 ('learning such as might be obtained from a study of the poets, who in Greece were the recognized teachers of men in theology, morals and other matters including arts and crafts').

[3] See further *fr.* B 41 DK. In a spurious *fr.* B 129 DK, we can see yet another attack against Pythagoras, this time presented as the one who 'devoted himself most of all humans to ἱστορίη', combining in his underhand activity σοφίη, πολυμαθίη and κακοτεχνίη (*cf.* also *fr.* B 81). Empedocles (*fr.* 31 B 129.3-5 DK), with due respect for the variety of Pythagoras' knowledge, may also be alluding to his πολυμαθίη (*cf.* Ion of Chios, *fr.* 36 B 4.3-4 DK).

[4] Cf. *fr.* B 2 DK and, more importantly, *fr.* B 50, where the Logos itself indicates that 'everything is one' (ἓν πάντα (εἶναι); cf. *frr.* B 10, 51 and 54). See further *fr.* B 57, for Heraclitus' criticism of Hesiod, wrongly supposed to possess the most extensive knowledge, but in fact unable to grasp the unity of all things (nights and

days, in the event; cf. *fr.* B 106); cf. *fr.* B 56 (on Homer). *Cf.* also, on a more popular level, Aesch. *TrGF* III, *fr.* 390; Pind. *Ol.* 2.86-8; and a (fifth-century or Hellenistic?) scholion attributed to Thales (*Suppl. Hel.* 521).

[5] *Cf.* the probably inauthentic *fr.* 299 DK (see below, p. 160, with n.100).

[6] Several generations later, Anaxarchus emphasizes the ambiguity of πολυμαθίη (72 B 1 DK), which can be both useful and harmful, a sign of either 'wisdom' or 'stupidity', depending on καιρός, or the 'right moment' to present one's ideas to the public. For this ambiguity, see perhaps also Arist. *fr.* 62 Rose[3]: ... τὴν πολυμάθειαν πολλὰς ταραχὰς (ἀρχὰς codd.) ποιεῖν.

[7] Bravo (2001) esp. 85. This quasi-Weberian 'disenchantment' with the world does not preclude the frequent presence of the miraculous in the Cyclic epics (*cf.* J. Griffin, *JHS* 97 (1977) 39-53).

[8] *Cf.* also his 'heavily ironic' (thus, e.g., Guthrie (1962-69) 1.417) *fr.* B 35 DK: χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι. But *cf.* Gladigow (1965) 27-31.

Now, in recent years, we have witnessed a constant attempt of Herodotean scholarship to put this author back in the intellectual context of fifth-century Greece.[9] Such an attempt, however, is very difficult, not least 'because the genre in which Herodotus wrote was not clearly defined, and because of the catholicity of Herodotus' own work'.[10] I suggest that the (hypothetical) debate opposing νοῦς (or σοφίη) and πολυμαθίη could have been one of the most important elements of the intellectual background of Herodotus' work. This opposition can provide us with useful intellectual tools to define his project and/or to ascribe it to a certain intellectual tradition. Here, however, another difficulty arises. Our assessment of Herodotus' genre and tradition depends on our overall view of his work and its genesis. If we concentrate on the intellectual environment of Herodotus' alleged oral performances, we will perceive the *Histories* and the historian's ἀπόδεξις as a result of the tradition of competitive display of knowledge, practised by various kinds of wandering σοφοί (sophists, philosophers, doctors, geographers, ethnographers, etc.).[11] The same perhaps remains true if we bear in mind the famous 'variety', or ποικιλία, of Herodotus' prose (Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3.11 Aujac), or if we remember the (allegedly) excessively digressive nature of the *Histories*.[12] From all these standpoints, I presume, Herodotus can be placed side by side with his predecessor Hecataeus, as an exponent of πολυμαθίη.

But if we think of the overall organization of the *Histories*, of the monumental composition of a meaningful whole, we can hardly avoid concluding that there was a qualitative leap between Herodotus' hypothetical public performances, on the one hand, and his book as we have it, on the other.[13] And this may stimulate quite another perception of Herodotus' work.

In the following, I do not intend to address the question of the overall composition of the *Histories*.[14] Instead, I shall try to solve our problem by examining the author's self-perception. In a word, did he present himself as a 'fox' or a 'hedgehog'?

*

Herodotus provides few programmatic authorial statements.[15] But, *a priori*, we might expect that the first place for him to declare his aims and to present himself to the public would be his prologue. Interestingly, most of the above-mentioned attempts at reconstructing his intellectual background avoid interpreting systematically this important passage of the work.[16] The explanation, I suggest, lies in two interconnected, though rarely openly stated reasons. First, most interpreters seem discouraged by some supposedly insoluble problems in the formal interpretation

[9] E.g. Fowler (1996); Thomas (2000); Raaflaub (2002); Luraghi (ed.) (2001). *Cf.* already Hunter (1982) and Corcella (1984), esp. 239-66.

[10] Quotation from C. Dewald and J. Marincola, in Boedeker and Peradotto (1987) 13 (*cf.* also a similar formulation in Thomas (2000) 7). *Cf.* recently Boedeker (2000) and, in general, Fowler (2001) 95-8.

[11] From this perspective, it was an offspring of 'this agonistic, display-oriented mode of exchanging and discussing ideas against which Thucydides reacted so energetically when he declared that his work was going to be no mere *agonisma*, no competition piece for the immediate pleasure of the listeners (I 22.4)' (Thomas (2000) 267). *Cf.* Lloyd (1987) 85-102; Raaflaub (2002) 163-4; Dorati (2000) 17-52.

[12] *Cf.*, however, the general implications of Bravo (2000). For a classic treatment of the subject, see Cobet (1971) *passim.*

[13] Recently, *cf.* in particular Rösler (2002) and Fowler (2001). *Contra*, e.g., Dorati (2000) *passim*, esp. 177-8 (for a more balanced view, see Thomas (2000), esp. 257-69).

[14] I shall try to do this elsewhere, in a book in preparation, based on my unpublished doctoral thesis (*Hérodote, Thucydide et un aspect de l'idéologie athénienne du Vème siècle* (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris 2000)).

[15] By 'programmatic authorial statements' I mean only some of 'the "markers" of the historian's voice' analysed by Fowler (1996) 69-80, esp. 70-1. In general, for Hdt.'s voice and authorial intrusions, see further Darbo-Peschanski (1987); C. Dewald in Boedeker and Peradotto (eds) (1987) 147-70; J. Marincola in Boedeker and Peradotto (1987) 121-37; Shrimpton (1997), esp. 229-65; Boedeker (2000); Thomas (2000), esp. 235-48; and the debate provoked by Fehling (1989) (original edn 1971). For the reactions to his arguments, see above all Fowler (1996) 81-6 (with n.126); also Luraghi (2001) and *idem, QS* 40 (1994) 181-90.

[16] See, however, Fowler (1996) 83-7, and Thomas (2000) 221-8, 267-9.

of the prologue (including the allegedly loose syntax of the first sentence).[17] Secondly, as a result, it is often assumed that the (alleged) syntactical – and hence intellectual – disorder of the first sentence makes it impossible to seek in it a coherent programme for the work. For some critics, the line of reasoning presented in this passage is nothing more than a desperate authorial attempt to embrace in a single compact sentence all the heterogeneous material of the *Histories*.[18] Less radically, one may claim that the prologue does no more than vaguely introduce some general organizing principles or important motifs of the work.[19]

I must admit that I consider all these ideas untenable. Unless proved otherwise, we must assume (1) that Herodotus composed his prologue at the very end of his project in order to present its subject and its principles to the public, and (2) that he was perfectly able to present therein his own views of the nature of his work and of his role as author. Accordingly, it is here, in the prologue, that we can expect him to tell us (1) what his work is going to be about, as well as (2) how he is going to narrate it. Needless to say, these questions entail the problem of Herodotus' literary tradition. Furthermore, his great successor Thucydides, who, on many levels, modelled his prologue on that of Herodotus,[20] felt it necessary to offer there an answer to all the questions mentioned above. This shows how he understood the prologue of Herodotus.

II. THE MACRO-SYNTACTICAL STRUCTURE OF THE PROLOGUE

Here is the display of the inquiry by Herodotus of Thurii[21] ('Ηροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε), lest the deeds of men (τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων) become pale through time (τῶι χρόνωι ἐξίτηλα γένηται), and great and wonderful achievements (ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωυμαστά) displayed (ἀποδεχθέντα) partly by Greeks and partly by barbarians become deprived of glory (ἀκλεᾶ γένηται), and in particular[22] the reason why they fought one another (τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι) [1 *procem.*]. Among the Persians, the learned men say that it was Phoenicians who were responsible for the conflict (Περσέων μέν νυν οἱ λόγιοι Φοίνικας αἰτίους φασὶ γενέσθαι τῆς διαφορῆς) ... [1.1.1].

At first sight, it may seem that the very logic of the first sentence of Herodotus should give us the answer to the question of the subject of the work. The problem is, however, that this sentence can be understood in two ways. Is Herodotus progressively narrowing the scope of the 'display of his inquiry' when he declares first his interest in the all-inclusive 'deeds of men', then his particular interest in much more specific 'great and wonderful achievements' (the lack of an article attracts our attention here), and finally his focus on the 'reason why they fought one another'? The obvious fact that the *Histories* culminate in the account of the Persian Wars

[17] See in particular Erbse (1956); Krischer (1965); Drexler (1972) 4-11; Hommel (1981), esp. 277-82. *Cf.* already W. Jaeger quoted by Pagel (1927) 5 (with n.10).

[18] For more or less radical versions of this view, see above all Hommel (1981); *cf.* Krischer (1965), followed by many critics. *Cf.* also Fehling (1989) 55-6.

[19] Thus, in different ways, e.g., Jacoby (1913) 335 (the prologue as a 'convenient passage' to the remainder of the *Histories*, while introducing at the same time some fundamental motifs of the work and the main lines of the narrative). From various standpoints, *cf.* O. Regenbogen, *Die Antike* 6 (1930), esp. 218-19, 227-8; Pohlenz (1937) 9-21; Immerwahr (1966) 18-19; Corcella (1984) 107-8, 110; Lateiner (1989) 15-16; Fehling (1989) 55, 58-9.

[20] *Cf.* in particular Moles (1993), esp. 98-100, and Bowie (1993), esp. 146-7 (although I do not follow his argument in every detail).

[21] *Cf.*, e.g., Jacoby (1913) 205-13.

[22] ... *cum reliqua opera tum ea quae mutui belli causam praebuerunt* (Latin trans. by J.C.F. Baehr, 2nd edn, Leipzig 1856), and already ... *cum alia, tum vero etiam etc.* by Lorenzo Valla (Venice 1474). I endorse this interpretation not least because this is the way Plato understood his text of Herodotus. In *Tim.* 20e-21a, he paraphrases the opening sentence of the *Histories* and reads this passage as follows: πάντων δὲ (*sc.* ἔργων) ἐν μέγιστον κτλ. (*cf.* Nagy (1990) 226). The strong link between the obscure group of words and 'great and wonderful achievements' is ensured among other things by the fact that the 'missing article' of ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωυμαστά (*cf.* τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων) can be found in the group τά τε ἄλλα καί. *Cf.* also Drexler (1972) 3-11. *Contra*, e.g., Jacoby (1913) 334-5, and Erbse (1956) 217. In general, *cf.* Porciani (1997) esp. 162-4.

usually makes critics believe that the first sentence climaxes with the famous αἰτίη-question,[23] preceded by the much debated group of words τά τε ἄλλα καί.[24] Accordingly, scholars usually tend to neglect the expression τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων[25] as much too indeterminate or imprecise a subject for the *Histories*. Such an all-encompassing subject seems simply no subject at all.[26] Conversely, I would argue that to assess the real force of the γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων clause, we need to go beyond the first sentence and concentrate on larger formal units opening the *Histories*.

When carefully reading the five introductory chapters of the *Histories*, one can hardly avoid the impression of a large-scale ring-composition with a subtle net of correspondences.[27] It is this larger division (as far as 1.5.4) that I consider to be the prologue of Herodotus' work.[28] I tentatively propose below a schematic simplification of this section which will enable us to see more clearly the composition of the whole.

A. Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε,
    B. ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων
                        B_1. τῶι χρόνωι ἐξίτηλα γένηται,
      C. μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωυμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι
      ἀποδεχθέντα,
                       C_1. ἀκλεᾶ γένηται,
        D. τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι (*prooimion*).
          E. Περσέων μέν νυν οἱ λόγιοι Φοίνικας αἰτίους φασὶ
            γενέσθαι τῆς διαφορῆς κτλ. (1.1.1)
              E_1. Μέχρι μὲν ὦν τούτου ἁρπαγὰς μούνας εἶναι
                  παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου Ἕλληνας
                  δὴ μεγάλως αἰτίους γενέσθαι κτλ. (1.4.1)
F. ... στόλον μέγαν συναγεῖραι καὶ ἔπειτα ἐλθόντας ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην τὴν Πριάμου δύναμιν κατελεῖν.
    (1.4.3)
              E_1. οὕτω μὲν Πέρσαι λέγουσι γενέσθαι, καὶ διὰ
                  τὴν Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν εὑρίσκουσι σφίσι
                  ἐοῦσαν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἔχθρης τῆς ἐς τοὺς
                  Ἕλληνας. (1.5.1)
          E. [...] ταῦτα μὲν νυν Πέρσαι τε καὶ Φοίνικες λέγουσι,
             ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἐρέων ὡς
             οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως κως ἐγένετο,

[23] Thus, e.g., Immerwahr (1966) 18. As such, Herodotus' proem looks at best 'more concerned with the justification of the author's purpose than with the definition of the contents of the work' (*ibid.* 17). Somewhat similarly, though from various standpoints, e.g., Drexler (1972) 5; Corcella (1984) 107; Lateiner (1989) 14; Nagy (1990) 218 and 226.

[24] 'And in particular' or rather 'among other things'? This alternative obviously opens the true Pandora's box of Herodotean scholarship, i.e. the problem of the relationship of what is (allegedly) stated in the proem on the one hand and the contents of the *Histories* on the other. In general, see below, 'Conclusions'.

[25] Drexler (1972) 5 hardly mentions it in his detailed word-by-word analysis of the first sentence (but *cf.* 183); *cf.* also Bakker (2001) 4. Among the very few exceptions to this view, I would mention Drews (1973) 85, 87, as well as Van Wees (2002) 321. See further Fehling (1989) 55.

[26] *Cf.*, e.g., Moles (1993) 92.

[27] For this formal device in Hdt., see, e.g., Immerwahr (1966) 54-8; *cf.* also Myres (1953) 81-8.

[28] A number of analyses of the prologue have committed the 'original sin' of identifying the 'prologue' or the 'proem' of the *Histories* with only the introductory sentence of the work. Sometimes, excessive speculation on the basis of the *incipit* has led to rather quaint interpretations. By contrast, that the prologue of Hdt. extends as far as 1.5 has rightly been emphasized already by Jacoby (1913) 283-5, 233-5, and many others after him (e.g. P.A. Stadter, *ICS* 6.1 (1981) 58-9). *Cf.* in general M. Pohlenz, *NGG* (1920) 59; and Fehling (1975) 66, for the significant shift from third- to first-person verbal forms which customarily marks the end of Greek prologue forms.

D. τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς
"Ελληνας, τοῦτον σημήνας προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου
C. ὁμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιών. (1.5.3)

C₁. – B₁. τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν,
τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρὰ γέγονε,
τὰ δὲ ἐπ' ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα,
πρότερον ἦν σμικρά.

B. – A. τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὧν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην οὐδαμὰ ἐν τὠυτῶι μένουσαν, ἐπιμνήσομαι
ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως. (1.5.4)

It is remarkable that, as far as I can see, no one has ever tried to analyse the introductory parts of the *Histories* as a well-organized formal structure. Of course, some scholars have perceived verbal echoes ensuring that the prologue embraces much more than the first sentence.[29] Thus, for instance, in 1.5.3 we encounter the 'cities of men' obviously echoing the 'deeds of men' from the opening sentence;[30] and 'the man of whom I know myself that he began unjust acts against the Greeks' refers back to the 'αἰτίη of the conflict' (*cf.* element 'D' above).[31] Meanwhile, in the intervening chapters, there are indeed many passages that tellingly echo one another.

Besides these correspondences, τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων and ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωυμαστά (*incipit*) are resumed by σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων in 1.5.3-4, where the motif of time and oblivion threatening all greatness is also present or at least implied (elements 'B' and 'C' above). There is also an obvious link between the first clause of 1.1.1 ('Among the Persians, the learned men say that it was the Phoenicians, etc.') and 1.5.1 ('This is what the Persians and the Phoenicians say', etc.) (element 'E' above). More importantly, the last sentence of the prologue, where the narrator announces what will be covered by his account (ἐπιμνήσομαι ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως) and indicates the secure basis of his knowledge (τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὧν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην κτλ.), looks back to the self-presentation Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, with the notion of 'human deeds' closely attached to it (elements 'A' and 'B' above).

In the following, I shall concentrate on other examples of formal correspondences as well as on their implications for our understanding of Herodotus' project. But already at this juncture, the foregoing reconstruction brings to light a noticeable phenomenon. A rigorously organized composition of the beginning of the *Histories* (I would call it the 'macro-syntactical structure' of the prologue) corresponds to a somewhat loose grammatical form on the 'micro-syntactical' level of the first sentence. Two conclusions seem inescapable here. First, all of this alerts us again to the fact that Herodotus is writing well before, so to speak, the 'Isocratean legislation' for Greek prose, but observes instead other clear rules. Secondly, what counted most for him was the whole 'extended preface', or prologue, rather than the first sentence, or *incipit*, of his work. It is on this level, then, that we should try to interpret the thought and the message of the prologue.

Following the logic of this immense but subtle 'pedimental composition' (to use the brilliant term introduced by John L. Myres), I shall start my analysis with its central section, i.e. with the account of mutual abductions of women (1.1.1-1.5.2).[32]

---

[29] *Cf.* previous note and, briefly, Moles (1993) 98.

[30] See, e.g., H. Stein, comm. *ad loc.*; Jacoby (1913) 334.

[31] E.g. Immerwahr (1966) 80, who has pointed out more detailed correspondences between the arrangement of thought in the *incipit* and in 1.5.3-4.

[32] To simplify my argument, hereafter I shall be using interchangeably the terms 'ring-composition' and 'pedimental composition' (*cf.* Myres (1953) 81-8; Immerwahr (1966) 71-2), which are not precise equivalents.

III. PERSIAN TALES, OR HERODOTUS' INITIAL *DIVERTIMENTO*

Something is fundamentally wrong with the stories ascribed by Herodotus to the 'learned Persians'. These stories are usually considered a thorough rationalization of Greek legends, though put into the mouths of some Orientals: Persians and Phoenicians. Another difficulty lies in the fact that these 'Orientals' go so far as to offer a parody of these purely Greek legends.[33] Furthermore, Herodotus does not argue with those accounts, but abruptly dismisses them to introduce, as he says, 'the first of whom I know myself'.[34] What, then, is the use of all this? Obviously, the lengthy passage placed in the middle of the prologue somehow has to be meaningful. The question is how.

In the scholarly tradition, we can identify two opposite attitudes to this passage. The first is to defend Herodotus' good name by investigating the 'source problem': if he claims that the learned Persians say this, he means it. Many penetrating analyses have been devoted to this problem, but, as it seems to me, to no avail.[35] On the other hand, certain scholars have rightly pointed out that it is immaterial whether the accounts of Herodotus' Persians are truly Oriental or not; what matters most is that he believed they were.[36] This may entail the old hypothesis of an intermediary Greek source (e.g. Hecataeus, other early prose writers, or Phrynichus) for the whole passage,[37] instead of an Oriental one.

Another attitude is to dismiss the whole account as bare falsification. As Detlev Fehling ((1989) 51) points out, it does not contain a single trace of 'any intermediate stage' between Greek legends and allegedly Persian stories. On a 'factual' level, different mythological units are given in a form familiar to us from epic and tragedy. This excludes not only the hypothesis of a genuine Oriental source but also that of an intermediary Greek one. All in all, we cannot help concluding with Fehling that 'Herodotus himself planned it that way after carefully working out what the Persians ought or ought not to know according to the logic of the story' (p. 54). Such considerations lead Fehling to the conclusion that this particular story excellently demonstrates his thesis on Herodotus' inventions of sources. I do not intend to debate here the overall thesis, with which I disagree (above, n.15), but observe simply that, like most of his predecessors, Fehling misses here the fundamental point, namely that this particular case is anything but typical for the *Histories* as a whole.

Consider first the status of Herodotus' informants. They are 'learned', or λόγιοι (ἄνδρες), of course, as are many other exponents of 'alien wisdom' in the *Histories*.[38] Here, however, they form a very peculiar and unusually vague group. Above all, they are not ἐπιχώριοι,[39] and no

[33] As Drews (1973) 89 once put it: 'The most glorious figures of the Age of Heroes are presented as shabby bawds and brawlers, whose exploits are more reminiscent of the *Decameron* than the *Iliad*.'

[34] Pelliccia (1992) identifies this move as a 'false-start *recusatio*', a sophisticated narrative dead-end, where 'something is introduced, only to be rejected in favor of something else, which is thereby highlighted by the preceding foil' (p. 64). But *cf.* Thomas (2000) 245-6 (with n.95).

[35] I mention only K. Reinhardt, in Marg (ed.) (1962) 342-4; von Fritz (1967) 1.166-7, 208-9; Bornitz (1968) 167-9. Recently, it is true, there have been some successful efforts to prove Hdt.'s (indirect) acquaintance with genuinely Persian traditions (see above all Lewis (1985) and, in general, Murray (2001) 36-44).

[36] *Cf.*, e.g., Fowler (1996) 84-6.

[37] See, e.g., Jacoby (1912) 2740 (Jacoby, following H. Diels, thought cautiously of Hecataeus); Pagel (1927) 12-13 (Hecataeus); recently, *cf.*, at least to some extent, Pelliccia (1992) 74-80 (Hecataeus), and, differently, A.E.

Raubitschek, *Tyche* 8 (1993) 143-4 (for Phrynichus' *Phoenician Women*). *Cf.*, briefly, Fowler (1996) 85 (Dionysius of Miletus?) and Thomas (2000) 267-8 (parody of 'Hecataeus and other early prose writers'). Long ago, von Fritz (1967) 2.117-21 n.1 undermined the identification of Hecataeus as a possible source of the passage (cf. *ibidem* 343-7). *Cf.* also n.55 below.

[38] See, e.g., 2.3.1, 77.1; or 4.46.1. As Luraghi (2001) 156-9 convincingly demonstrates (*cf.* also his 'Introduction', in Luraghi (ed.) (2001) 6-7), for Hdt., λόγιος means simply 'learned', 'cultivated', or 'clever'; λόγιοι ἄνδρες are not an institution typical of barbarian peoples, as has long been maintained, nor professional remembrancers of any kind. *Contra* Jacoby (1949) 215-25 and 386 n.5, and von Fritz (1967) 2.343-7 (*cf.* Jacoby (1913) 392-419 and Nagy (1987)).

[39] On ἐπιχώριοι and on the 'local knowledge' in Hdt., see in particular H. Verdin, *AncSoc* 1 (1970), esp. 183-91, and recently Luraghi (2001). In general, *cf.* Marincola (1997), esp. 86-95.

local tradition or any other source of their knowledge is referred to; hence they are by no means a privileged source of information. Instead, they present the most partisan versions of tales about 'abductions of women'; moreover, they deeply disagree among themselves about what really happened. In a word, the whole account does not contain any element typical of the usual Herodotean techniques of 'make-believe'.[40] As will be made clear shortly, Herodotus thereby warns us that what these 'learned Persians' say is a case apart; their status is to be carefully distinguished from that of reliable informants mentioned throughout the *Histories*. This impression is further supported by his ostentatious (and obviously ironic) agnosticism about those tales in 1.5.3.[41]

Now, the most important point Fehling's criticism of Herodotus misses here is the author's humour. First of all, two of the abduction-cases (Europe and Io) are striking indeed, as they form prime examples of Zeus's love affairs, a theme often used to produce a comical effect in Greek literature. Could it not have appeared funny to the contemporary Greek public that the 'clever Persians' were not able to name those responsible (1.1.4-1.2.1)? Consider other blatant omissions, such as the anonymous warship sailing to Colchis, which is in fact the world-famous *Argo*, or (perhaps more amusingly still) 'the other things for which they had come' (καὶ τᾶλλα τῶν εἵνεκεν ἀπίκατο), which is the Golden Fleece itself (1.2.2) – what a charming example of *interpretatio Persica* of Greek mythology! But Herodotus' most telling hint comes last. After presenting the account of Alexander's rape of Helen, Herodotus directly gives the floor to the Persians, who offer their comments (i.e. more than just their account) on the κακά of the Trojan War, a frequent motif of Greek literature. 'They, for their part, made no account of the women carried off from Asia but ... the Greeks, because of a Lacedaemonian woman, gathered a great army, came straight to Asia, and destroyed the power of Priam' (1.4.3; trans. D. Grene, modified).[42] The wording of the phrase, Λακεδαιμονίης εἵνεκεν γυναικός, is far from innocent, if we remind ourselves of a widespread ancient opinion about the 'integrity' of Spartan women.[43] No wonder, then, that the Persians have the right to say: 'It is the work of unjust men ... to carry off women at all; but once they have been carried off, to take seriously the avenging of them is the part of fools, as it is the part of sensible men to pay no heed to the matter: clearly, the women would not have been carried off had they had no mind to be' (1.4.2).

'Had they had no mind to be abducted' – the idea is further illustrated by the case of Io in the Phoenician version of this episode (1.5.2). And this is precisely what the slanderers of Helen repeatedly say in Greek literature, as it is the motif brilliantly refuted in the *Defence of Helen* by Gorgias – a work perhaps inspired by this Herodotean passage.[44] The whole passage looks then highly amusing, and its effect seems to be based on the conceit, not unfamiliar to European literature in later times, of presenting our own usual behaviour or ways of thinking (here, basic

---

[40] It seems revealing that Hdt. does not use here his 'extensive vocabulary to discuss his relationship with his sources' (for this, see Fowler (1996) 77) and that he does not try to define the limits of possible knowledge for this mythical period (e.g. 'so far as I have been able to push my inquiry', etc.).

[41] For this agnosticism, *cf.*, from the 'narratological' perspective, Dewald (1999) 228-33; however, this interpretation, too, misses the peculiarity of the 'Persian tales' as compared to the rest of the *Histories*. *Cf.* also Vanicelli (2001) 213-14, who establishes a functional analogy between the prologue and 2.2-4, another example of 'false-start *recusatio*', this time establishing the starting-point of the historical narrative devoted to Egypt (*cf.* n.34 above). Thomas (2000) 268 offers some intriguing analogies of this 'false-start' from medical writers.

[42] In Euripides, for instance, we find a similar expression (*Tro.* 368-9): '(the Achaeans) who for the sake of one woman and one passion have lost a countless army in hunting Helen' (trans. E.P. Coleridge). It is worth noting that this phrase is put in the mouth of another 'barbarian interpreter' of the origins of the conflict, Cassandra. *Cf.* also *Tro.* 983-97 and *Andr.* 605-6.

[43] See, e.g., Hdt. 6.68.3; Eur. *Andr.* 590-604 (esp. 595-6); Pl. *Leg.* 637c. In general, see Millender (1999), esp. 356-63; *cf.* also L. Thommen, *MH* 56 (1999) 129-49, and Cartledge (2001) 106-26. *Non vidi*: S. Pomeroy, *Spartan Women* (Oxford 2002).

[44] For some noticeable similarities between the prologue of the *Histories* and the *Defence of Helen*, see Pelliccia (1992) 80-4, who remains very cautious in determining who followed whom (esp. 83 n.45).

literary traditions, if not beliefs) through the eyes of the 'Others'.[45] From this point of view, I would call this whole passage a *divertimento*, a playful piece, put at the beginning of the work as a display of the author's proficiency and a sort of seductive invitation to the reader, perhaps even a parody of a sophistic (mythical) display piece, or *epideixis*.[46] I think, however, that we should look for a much more profound and serious meaning of this passage, placed, as it were, in the middle of the introductory and thus admittedly programmatic section of the work.

If we leave aside the amusing 'barbarian disguise' of the tales, we have to notice that they are thoroughly Greek. The whole passage has an undoubtedly parodic flavour.[47] The question is what the target of this parody is. To my mind, to look for a (single) particular Greek source (or model) for our tales is to put our question in the wrong terms. Carolyn Dewald observed that, in the tales under scrutiny here, 'for Herodotus' Greek audiences, their legends and myths hover as an unspoken ghostly presence on the narrative stage'. The very logic of the narrative implies this 'ghostly presence' of 'missing Greek mythographers and poets'.[48]

Now, if we view Herodotus' prologue against the background of other prologue-forms of early Greek prose writers,[49] this is hardly surprising. Both Hecataeus and Thucydides allude to their predecessors in order to discredit the traditions providing the starting-point for their respective works[50] and to stress the exceptional value of their own enterprise, based upon their new methodological principles.[51] In Hecataeus, Alcmaeon, Heraclitus and – to some extent – Thucydides, it is rather 'Greeks' or Greek traditions in general that become the target of their polemic self-presentation.[52] The same is, I assume, true about Herodotus' 'Persian tales'. We must then ask ourselves about the broader tradition being parodied by the author. R. Drews ((1973) 89) thought, among other things, of the method of 'subjective rationalization' of myth by Herodotus' predecessors. I would argue that, though 'translating' original deeds of gods and heroes into those of highly non-heroic humans, Herodotus is not interested in 'rationalization' as such, i.e. in eradicating marvellous elements of his stories by giving a 'probable' interpretation of them. Instead, he just passes them over in silence[53] and, what is more, this very decision triggers the amusing effect of the tales.

[45] *Cf.* already Hdt. 1.153.1 (Cyrus on Greek *agorai*) and 7.9 β 1-2 (another Persian, Mardonius, on Greek warfare). Note that in his parodic version of the origins of the conflict between Greeks and barbarians, Hdt. reverses the usual way of presenting these traditions: first, it is Greeks and not Orientals who started the conflict; secondly and consequently, it is Orientals and not Greeks who issue the writ against the culprits.

[46] *Cf.* Thomas (2000), esp. 257 on sophists backing up their points using 'myths' in their *epideixeis*. For the possible relationship between Hdt. and the 'sophistic movement' of his time, see esp. Corcella (1984) 239-43; Thomas (2000) *passim* (important general remarks: 18-19); Raaflaub (2002) 160-1. For a more traditional approach, *cf.*, e.g., Nestle (1940) 509-13; A. Dihle, *Philologus* 106 (1962) 207-20.

[47] Drews (1973) 89; *cf.* Lateiner (1989) 38 (with n.74), 40-3; Thomas (2000) 268 and 274. For the 'ironic' or 'satirical' character of this passage, see already Howald (1944) 34-7; *cf.* also Hartog (1991) vii.

[48] Dewald (1999) 226 and 227 respectively.

[49] *Cf.* the works cited in n. 28 above, as well as, in general, Porciani (1997), esp. 44-77.

[50] *FGrHist* 1 F 1 (οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν) ~ Thuc. 1.20-1. See also Alcmaeon of Croton, 24 [14] B 1 DK, and Heraclit. 22 B 1 DK.

[51] *FGrHist* 1 F 1 (τάδε γράφω, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι) ~ Thuc. 1.20.3 *ad fin.*-1.22.3. That is how, I would say, Thucydides understood the function of the 'Persian tales' in Herodotus (for Thucydides modelling his prologue on that of Herodotus, see n.20 above). Incidentally, I wonder whether it was from Hecataeus' Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι that Hdt. got his idea of giving a parodic flavour to his polemics. *Cf.* also Antiochus of Syracuse, *FGrHist* 555 F 2; Ctes. *FGrHist* 688 T 11h, and F 45 (51). See further Fowler (1996) 69-72.

[52] Although Thucydides criticizes here (implicitly) Homer and Herodotus in particular (*cf.* Hornblower (1996), esp. 19-20, 123-37; but see previous notes for possible Hecataean overtones in Thuc.), he aims at discrediting the overall attitude of the Greeks to their past (*cf.* 1.20.1 and 3 *init.*). This differs from what he did in his short polemics against Hellanicus (1.97.2), whom (significantly perhaps) he mentions by name.

[53] Note that the most important 'marvels' of relevant Greek tales were the metamorphosis of Zeus, that of Io, the magical ship *Argo* and the Golden Fleece (including its first owner: the talking ram). As far as we can tell, early prose writers repeatedly treated these elements by rationalizing them (*cf.*, e.g., Acus. *FGrHist* 2 FF 26, 27, 29, and 37). *Cf.*, incidentally, Hecat. *FGrHist* 1 F 17. For 'rationalism, rationalization, and rationality', see Hunter (1982) 107-15. More recently, see in particular Bertelli

To my mind, the most salient feature and the most hilarious aspect of the 'Persian tales' is the overall pattern of an absurdly long chain of mutual (paired) abductions of women explaining the remote origins of the enmity between Greeks and barbarians, and thus the origins of a major war. We need not look far to find a literary model for such a chain in Greek tradition. The beginning of the *Iliad* provides an obvious precedent. Homer does not ask therein the underlying question of the origins and reasons of the Trojan War itself, but, taking the case of Helen as an implicit model (a sort of 'absent starting-point'), he introduces the Chryseis and Briseis affairs. At every stage of the escalating conflict, he shows the rape of a woman as a source of evil.

A careful reader of Homer – and Herodotus was no doubt such a reader – cannot miss the fact that the '*cherchez la femme*' motif belongs to a rather superficial register inside the multi-dimensional Homeric causality. Ultimately, Homer is interested in a much more profound explanation of the κακά that befall humans. But we can be sure that some later poets and prose writers understood Homeric causality more superficially.[54] For the sake of convenience, I shall provisionally call this way of presenting reasons for important events the 'pseudo-epic causality'. I assume then that by subordinating the whole passage to the 'abduction of women' motif, Herodotus tried amusingly to criticize the common explanation of the origins of great wars between humans.[55] It is not by chance, but to strike his readers by its ludicrousness, that Herodotus placed in the middle of his prologue (element 'F' above) the idea that the Greeks 'destroyed the power of Priam' simply because of Helen (1.4.3).

But the entertaining absurdity of our tales is not only due to the fact that the rape of women becomes the fundamental explanatory pattern in history, but also to the fact that this pattern gathers together different episodes with no real causal nexus.[56] Herodotus is careful to emphasize that: he ostentatiously provides a purely temporary link between consecutive abduction episodes – 'and after that' (1.2.1 and 1.2.1 *ad fin.*: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα) or 'and in the next generation after that' (1.3.1) – which in fact gives the impression of a 'fragmentation' of these episodes.[57] I suspect that this is yet another parody, this time targeting the mechanical way of multiplying and binding stories which was characteristic of some poets of the so-called 'Epic Cycle' and of post-Homeric epic in general. Herodotus, I suggest, might have eagerly endorsed the famous declaration of a poet from the *Palatine Anthology* (11.130.1-2 = *Cyclus epicus* T 21 Bernabé): 'I

(2001) 84-9, for the problem of Hecataeus' 'rationalism' (cf. *ibidem* 84 n.49, for further references to the scholarly debates on the subject). For 'demythologization in Herodotus', see now West (2002).

[54] For such a reading of the *Iliad*, cf. Ath. 13.560b, and, in much more obscene terms, *Priapea* 68.9-18 (I owe these references to A. Wolicki). In general, cf. Bowie (1993) 143-6 (for some possible Iliadic echoes in the 'beginnings' of Thuc.'s work).

[55] Such explanations – deeply rooted in earlier literary traditions – may well have been quite popular in the first years of the Peloponnesian War, as another parody (Ar. *Ach*. 524-40) suggests (unlike many scholars, I would emphasize with Drews (1973) 90, that Aristophanes, who fully understood his parody, 'laughed with, not at, Herodotus'; to some extent, cf. Myres (1953) 15-16 and 135-6. In general, see also Asheri (1991) lxiii, with the secondary literature quoted; cf. recently Pelling (2000) 151-5). What is more, in 430 or 429 BC (?), in his *Dionysalexandros* (see the argument of the play in *P.Oxy.* 663 (= *PCG* test. i), esp. lines 44-8), Cratinus presented the origins of the Peloponnesian War in terms of a parody of the origins of the Trojan War (Aspasia as Helen, and

Pericles as Dionysus disguised as Paris; *cf.* also the hypothetical plot of the play *Nemesis* (*PCG* frr. 114-27) by the same playwright (431 BC?): Helen/Aspasia (?) as the ultimate source of the war). (I owe this reference to A. Wolicki.) Recently, *cf.* M. Revermann, *JHS* 117 (1997) 197-200 (with earlier literature on the subject in his n.1).

[56] *Cf.* Pelliccia (1992) 74-80, who suggests, however, that the main target of Herodotus is the genealogical approach of Hecataeus.

[57] Note that in Herodotus' own narrative, in order to provide a causal chain between different generations (causal nexus being usually based on the principle of retribution), we need the sameness (be it purely ethnic *vel sim.*) of the victim-avenger and/or that of the wrongdoer. See, e.g., Hdt. 3.48.1 (*cf.* also 6.126.1, where a purely temporal link regulates the story of the same family). In our case, the subsequent victims and wrongdoers have nothing in common (ethnically, geographically, etc.), their sameness being due to the highly partisan and no doubt arbitrary *ex post* interpretation by the 'clever Persians' (1.4.4 *ad fin.*). *Cf.* also Pelling (2000) 155, on '"and then" exchanges' explaining wars in Hdt.'s prologue and Ar. *Ach*.

hate the cyclic poets, those who repeatedly say "and thereafter" (αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα), those clothes-stealers of songs of other poets' (i.e. above all those of Homer). No doubt, this 'and thereafter'-style narrative was also typical of many genealogical and mythographical works in prose.

To put it in our own terms, Herodotus' criticism of the 'pseudo-epic causality' is directed against a peculiar habit of constructing superficial explanatory patterns of great events, including massive wars and destructions of large empires, out of secondary episodes linked together by a very banal if not coarse association of ideas. Of course, this intellectual habit was not in fact confined to post-Homeric poetry, but was probably more widespread; it almost certainly appeared in some prose writers of the time.[58] This bent seems to be closely connected with the afore-mentioned 'pragmatic tendency' of the late Archaic and early Classical poetry and prose that had no interest in the symbolic aspect of the world (see above, p. 144). This tendency must have entailed some profound consequences in the realm of causality, as is clear already from *fr.* 1 Bernabé of the *Cypria*, where the mysterious 'plan of Zeus' – in the *Iliad* somehow related to the human κακά and perhaps to the problem of the human condition – is now banally interpreted as a cure for the overpopulation of the Earth.[59]

Fortunately, we do not need to speculate about Herodotus' attitude towards the type of causality present in the 'Persian tales'. In a famous passage in Book 2, he states his own opinion about the origins of the Trojan War (2.120.5). Helen was not present in Troy at all, but the Greeks did not believe it: '... And the reason for this, if I may declare my opinion, was that the Divine was laying his plans (τοῦ δαιμονίου παρασκευάζοντος) that, as the Trojans perished in utter destruction, they might make this thing manifest to all the world: that for great wrongdoings, great also are the punishments from the gods. That is what I think, and that is what I am saying here' (trans. D. Grene).[60] This earnest declaration can by no means be reconciled with the role played by Helen in the prologue. In fact, the abduction of a woman as the real cause of a great historical (or mythical) cataclysm is for him a pure absurdity.[61] Herodotus does not question that the kidnap of Helen provoked the war. But this is not enough to explain the true reason for the conflict. For him (as most probably already for Homer), the case of Helen proves paradigmatic and refers the reader to a much deeper reality (in both authors, 'divine schemes' automatically imply the κακά of the human condition), which usually eludes human comprehension. Historical causality is not a matter of human tit-for-tat activity, but necessarily has a theological dimension.[62] Thus, instead of arbitrarily associating minor episodes devoid of deeper meaning, Herodotus seeks an overall principle governing human affairs, and ultimately finds it in the 'plans of the divinity'. In his abduction stories, he light-heartedly dismisses the tendency of some of his predecessors and contemporaries to deprive the world of its ethico-religious aspect.

---

[58] One could perhaps refer here to Acus. *FGrHist* 2 F 39 (= 39a Fowler), drawing on the *Iliad* (Aphrodite causes the fall of Troy out of sheer nepotism), but our evidence is too scanty to go any further.

[59] See also [Hes.] *Cat. Women, fr.* 204 Merkelbach-West, interpreted now by Bravo (2001) 93-5. But *cf.* K. Mayer, *AJPh* 117 (1996) 1-15, for an attractive reading of the Διὸς βουλή (and the said fragment of the *Cypria*) within the frame of a mythological tradition (with some interesting Oriental parallels) linking the overpopulation motif with an explanation for wars among humans (the creation of Helen as an αἴτιον of wars: esp. 9-14). Still, irrespective of some underlying mythological motifs and traditions, Homer seems free enough from them in his understanding of the deep meaning of the Trojan War as a paradigm of the human condition.

[60] *Cf.* also 4.205, and 9.16.4-5 (the words of an anonymous Persian apply well to the tragic position of

the Trojans unable to persuade the Greeks that they do not have Helen to give back, in 2.120.5 *init.*). Note that Hdt. 2.120.5 was perhaps inspired by Aesch. *Ag.* 532-7 (πανώλεθρον ... δόμον (Aesch.) ~ πανωλεθρίηι ἀπολόμενοι (Hdt.); διπλᾶ δ' ἔτεισαν ... θἀμάρτια (Aesch.) ~ ὡς τῶν μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων μεγάλαι εἰσὶ καὶ τιμωρίαι (Hdt.).) *Cf.* also E. Fraenkel on *Ag.* 535-6.

[61] The *cherchez-la-femme* motif as a deeper explanation of a war appears, if I am not badly mistaken, only once in Herodotus, but this version of the origins of the Persian invasion of Egypt is openly dismissed by the narrator (3.3.1: καὶ ὅδε λόγος ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιθανός). Other memorable 'harem stories' in Hdt. are all about greed, lust and power, and thus illustrate the author's most profound ideas about man.

[62] See, in general, Harrison (2000). *Cf.* also West (2002) 38-9.

Now, Herodotus himself gives us a convenient hint on how to understand this passage: 'once [the women] have been carried off, to take seriously the avenging of them is the part of fools, as it is the part of sensible men to pay no heed to the matter' (1.4.2). As sensible men, Persians, of course, 'made no account' (λόγον οὐδένα ποιήσασθαι) of all this (1.4.3). This is exactly what Herodotus wants us to do. We the readers should pay no attention to the series of mutual abductions of women. And this is what Herodotus does himself in 1.5.3, when he abruptly declares: 'These are the accounts of the Persians and of the Phoenicians. For my part, I am not going to go on talking about these things, saying that they happened in this way or that (... ὡς οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως κως ταῦτα ἐγένετο). Instead, the man whom I know myself to have been the first to commit injustice against the Greeks, etc.' (1.5.3; trans. R. Drews, modified).

This total rejection of the accounts of the 'learned Persians' and their Phoenician opponents is generally taken as corresponding to the alleged dismissal of the heroic past in the opening sentence (τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων).[63] To put it briefly, it is conceived in terms of Herodotus' attempt to establish his own authority as a researcher by introducing a barrier between *spatium mythicum* and *spatium historicum*, accessible to a variety of intellectual tools and procedures of inquiry. Such a sharp distinction may not be that of Herodotus himself;[64] but in any case, by emphasizing only this side of the matter we surely miss an important point. In the logic of our pedimental composition, the passage introducing Croesus (though without naming him for the moment) corresponds with the opening question about the αἰτίη of the conflict (element 'D' in my diagram). The keynote of the intervening accounts is also the problem of αἰτίη,[65] that of responsibility and reciprocity. It seems clear that by opposing his own interpretation to the preceding stories, Herodotus is less concerned with the contents of these tales and with their epistemological status (say, myth *vs.* history), than with the way they present causes of great events. Henceforth, starting from Croesus, his personal inquiry, or ἱστορίη, will be the ultimate warranty of the accuracy and hence usefulness of a peculiar vision of the chain of causes and effects which eventually leads to the great battles of the Persian Wars (and beyond).[66] The whole work of Herodotus assumes an immense aetiological form.[67] The accounts of the 'Persian tales' and their contrast with the οἶδα αὐτός passage are then intended to show how one *should not* explain the origins of great conflicts.[68] Thus, Herodotus tries to replace traditional Greek habits of thought with his own discovery: a thorough and sustained aetiological inquiry.

*

[63] *Cf.* also Hdt. 3.122.2, and 2.3.2-4.1 (with Vannicelli (2001), esp. 213-15; {2.143-4}; 6.53.

[64] Since Jacoby (1913) 335, this 'great divide' concept has become a true *communis opinio*. See, e.g., Pohlenz (1937) 7; von Fritz (1967) 1.208-9; and recently: Darbo-Peschanski (1987) 25-38; Asheri (1991) on 1.5.3; Corcella (1984) 109; *cf.* Lateiner (1989) 63-7; Hartog (1991) iii-viii; Fowler (1996) 83; Raaflaub (2002) 159 (with n.33). Contrast: W.M. von Leyden, *DUJ* 11 (1949-50) 92-7; Murray (2001) 20; West (2002) 38 n.60; and esp. Harrison (2000) 197-207 and Cobet (2002) 405-11.

[65] As Krischer (1956) 160-2 rightly observes, even on a formal level the word *aitiê* is a key word for the whole section, as it marks the transition from the first sentence to what follows (δι' ἢν αἰτίην ~ Φοίνικας αἰτίους φασὶ γενέσθαι) in much the same way as the word ἔρις in the *Iliad* (1.6-8), or the word νόστος in the *Odyssey* (1.9-13), foreshadowing in both cases the main subject of the ensuing poem.

[66] For the political message conveyed by Hdt. to his contemporary audience, see esp. H. Strasburger, *Historia* 4 (1955) 1-25; Fornara (1971) 46-58 and 79-91; Corcella (1984) 186-219; Raaflaub (1987) and (2002), esp. 164-83; P.A. Stadter, *ASNP* 22/3 (1992) 781-809; Moles (1996) and (2002); Fowler (2003). I tried to deal with this set of problems in my doctoral dissertation (n.14 above; *cf.* already *AncSoc* 27 (1996)).

[67] Famously, the aetiological parts of the *Histories*, announced in the *incipit*, lead us as far as 5.97.3, where the Athenian 'evil-carrying' ships finally sail to Ionia. The verbal echo (*ibidem*: αὗται δὲ αἱ νέες ἀρχὴ κακῶν ἐγένοντο Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι) of the *incipit* is of course carefully meditated by Hdt.

[68] See already Lateiner (1989) 38 (n.74) and 41-2; *cf.* now Pelling (2000) 155.

From the preceding argument, we can draw several conclusions concerning the problem of Herodotus' literary tradition and genre. His initial *divertimento* obviously belongs to the intellectual environment of the 'agonistic, display-oriented mode of exchanging and discussing ideas' (above, n.11). The authorial self-presentation of the prologue is both light-hearted and serious at the same time. At the very outset of his work, Herodotus' own stance is defined *per differentiam*, as opposed to some popular habits of mind of his intended audience and its literary traditions. This enables him both to define the method of his inquiry into the origins of the conflict, and to give implicitly a more profound criticism of a particular view of the world. All this is no doubt intended to establish the author's authority, i.e. the character, the limits and the contents of his knowledge. The 'negative definition' of Herodotus' knowledge gives the impression of a deliberately innovative attitude on the part of the author, but some obvious traditional undertones of the prologue (see below) point to the contrary. In the following section, I shall try to clarify the exact nature of his knowledge and literary *persona*.

IV. 'SMALL AND GREAT CITIES OF MEN'

When discussing the declarations of the *incipit*, scholars often stress its epic or more specifically Homeric reminiscences.[69] Consequently, they concentrate on Herodotus' design to maintain the glory of great events from the past. From this standpoint, he seems a steadfast continuator of Homer and epic tradition. Although at the very beginning Herodotus introduces a broad and rather non-poetic idea of recording τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων in general, he appears to narrow the scope of his project immediately afterwards, restricting himself to a subject more suitable to epic – ἔργα μεγάλα καὶ θωυμαστά. With the notion of 'greatness' deserving the unqualified glory conferred by the writer who saves these ἔργα from oblivion, we are fairly close to the realm of poetry. However, if we look at a relevant passage at the end of the 'extended preface', we get quite a different impression.

Both negative final clauses of the opening sentence acquire a supplementary dimension when confronted with their *pendant* in the ring-composition sketched above (elements 'B' and 'C'). The 'time factor', which threatens 'the deeds of men' and may cast the shadow of oblivion on 'great and wonderful achievements' is further specified in 1.5.4: '... having so marked him [i.e. the 'first offender' of the Greeks], I will go forward in my account, traversing alike the small and great cities of mankind. For of those that were great in earlier times most have now become small, and those that were great in my time were small in the time before' (1.5.3 *ad fin.*-4; trans. D. Grene, modified). In these words scholars have rightly perceived another Homeric echo, namely the allusion to the opening lines of the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 1.1-4). Thus, the Herodotean narrator takes his road following in Odysseus' footsteps.[70] Important though they are, epic overtones of the prologue should not dominate our interpretation.[71] As a matter of fact, nothing is more remote from the spirit of epic poetry than Herodotus' words here. For, unexpectedly, after reading the *incipit*, one realizes that here the notion of 'greatness' (and, consequently, that of 'glory') is qualified and becomes problematic.[72] Not just 'great and wonderful' things deserve our attention, but also small ones, provided that with time they have become great. This is a truly noteworthy declaration, since, as far as we can see, it goes directly 'against the current' of the literary tradition(s) and 'habits of mind' popular in Herodotus' time. On the one hand, the Greeks do not usually perceive a temporal or historical relationship between their own 'age of iron' and

---

[69] See above all Pohlenz (1937) 3, 9; Huber (1956) 46; Nagy (1987); Corcella (1984), esp. 110; Erbse (1992) 122-32; *cf.* some remarks of W. Jaeger quoted by Pagel (1927) 99-101. In general, *cf.* also Jacoby (1913) 502-4; Strasburger (1972). Recently, *cf.* Boedeker (2002).

[70] *Cf.*, e.g., Huber (1965) 46; Strasburger (1972) 40-1. In general, see further Marincola (1997) 63-86.

[71] *Pace* Nagy (1990) 235-7. *Cf.* the important remarks by Thomas (2000) 218.

[72] In a similar vein, see Corcella (1984), esp. 109-10.

the time of the epic heroes.[73] On the other, as Rosalind Thomas ((2001) 206) puts it, 'much of the focus of Greek tradition, "memory" or oral tradition, is trying to connect family or polis to the Homeric heroes, the world of Homeric poems'. Both attitudes amount to the fact that, in the Greek popular view, 'greatness' becomes a rather static idea, especially when applied to great things or deeds extending over the space of both 'human' and 'mythical' times. It is not mere propaganda or megalomania if an aristocratic family tries to trace its origins from a god or a hero, or when citizens of a prosperous city are disappointed not to find a mention of their past greatness (or their valiant eponyms) in 'good old poetry'.[74] Obviously, what is great now must have always been so. This is a well-known feature of 'genealogical thinking', in which fluid traditions change and adapt constantly under the pressure of changing actual power relationships.[75] Conversely, since Herodotean 'greatness' may well embrace things that are by no means great for his contemporary reader, the 'inquiry' of the author will by necessity be our sole recourse, the only way to discover 'greatness' that through time has become small.[76]

Thus, the logic of the whole argument of the prologue becomes clear only at the end. As compared with the 'narrowing' logic of the opening sentence (from 'the deeds of men' to the αἰτίη of the conflict *via* 'great and wonderful achievements'), Herodotus' thinking here develops in the opposite direction: from 'the first of whom I know' to the 'cities great and small alike' and beyond, i.e. from the particular to the general. We should also note the peculiar arrangement of the last sentence (1.5.3-4): 'I will go forward in my account, traversing alike (ὁμοίως) the small and great cities of mankind ... I will make mention of both alike' (ὁμοίως). This framing, emphasizing the word ὁμοίως, has rightly been considered by Wolfgang Schadewaldt ((1962) 187-8) as a clear signal of Herodotus' declared objectivity and of his humanistic outlook. It is only here that we can appreciate the full force of the corresponding expression τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων in the *incipit*. His proclaimed first aim is actually to record all the various kinds of human activity.[77]

The real climax of the whole pedimental composition comes at its very end, where, if we follow the logic of our formal structure, the first clause of the first sentence finds its *pendant* in the closing sentence of the whole (elements 'A' and 'B' above): 'Since, then, I know that man's good fortune never abides in the same place, I will make mention of both alike (τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὧν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην οὐδαμὰ ἐν τὠυτῶι μένουσαν, ἐπιμνήσομαι ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως, 1.5.4).' It now becomes clear that 'the deeds of men' correspond to the mention of the instability of the 'human εὐδαιμονίη'. Both ideas are complementary and introduce the notion of the 'cycle of human affairs'.[78] Furthermore, the initial 'labelling' expression ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε is resumed later on by the self-referential pair ἐπιστάμενος–ἐπιμνήσομαι.[79] Perhaps simplifying a little, we may say that Herodotus' 'display' is presented as a result of his special knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) acquired by means of his 'inquiry'. The true contents of this special type of

---

[73] *Cf.*, in general, Murray (2001) 22; Cobet (2002) 388-9; *cf.* also Thomas (2001) 199; Fowler (2001) 113.

[74] Hence, on the one hand, the striking activity of the (hypothetical) 'Athenian redactor' of [Hes.] *Cat. Women*, and, on the other, the overall attitude of Pherecydes of Athens (*FGrHist* 3 *passim*). *Cf.* also Hecat. *FGrHist* 1 F 300.

[75] See in general R. Fowler, *PCPS* 44 (1998) 3-5, 16-18, and esp. 19 (useful brief remarks on Herodotus' use of genealogies). *Cf.*, from a somewhat different perspective, Bertelli (2001), esp. 74-6.

[76] As W. Rösler, *Philologus* 135 (1991) 215-20, pointed out, the use of the imperfect tense while referring to the 'cities that were great' in the author's lifetime (τὰ δὲ ἐπ' ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα) indicates an attempt at the

Selbsthistorisierung des Autors (see now Rösler (2002), esp. 91-3); *cf.* Corcella (1984) 192-4. *Cf.* also Fowler (2001) 113-14, on early historians' awareness of the time-gap between past and present and therefore of the need to bridge it.

[77] Thus also Van Wees (2002) 321.

[78] See the famous passages: Hdt. 1.207.2 and 1.32.1, as well as Soph. *Aj.* 646-7 and 669-77. *Cf.*, e.g., Schadewaldt (1962) 188; in general, de Romilly (1975).

[79] For this pair, *cf.*, e.g., 1.51.4, where the narrator refuses to reveal his knowledge (also gained through his 'inquiry'). However, as B. Bravo warns me, this passage may be interpolated. *Cf.* also 5.22 (... (τυγχάνω) ἐπιστάμενος... ἀποδείξω κτλ.) and 1.32.1 (n.111 below).

knowledge are no doubt fluctuations of human fate,[80] implied already in the notion of oblivion threatening great human achievements (*incipit*).

Now, in his paper on 'Herodotos and his contemporaries' Robert Fowler quotes two passages pertinent to Herodotus, where appears the idea of σοφίη, which the 'wise man' should seek and not begrudge but perform or demonstrate to others.[81] To my mind, neither passage ([Thgn.] 769-72, and Pl. *Protag.* 320 b) offers a perfect parallel with Herodotus, but rather both suggest a promising path of inquiry by sketching the intellectual context in which – in view of my preceding argument – we can safely place Herodotus as a σοφός.[82] The question is, however, what kind of σοφός he was. To answer this question, some formal considerations may again be helpful. In a paper devoted to the 'hymnal elements in the philosophical prose of the Presocratics', Karl Deichgräber presents a very interesting formal analysis of the fragment 59 B 12 DK of Anaxagoras, an older contemporary of Herodotus. Deichgräber identifies several features in respect of which Anaxagoras' prose approximates to solemn enunciations of religious poetry, namely the repetition of what he calls the 'notion of totality' (*Allbegriff:* in the event, various forms of πᾶν) as well as the division of this 'notion of totality' into some traditional antitheses (*cf.* καὶ μείζω καὶ ἐλάσσω).[83] We may add to this list particularly solemn and all-embracing temporal expressions such as ἔστι καὶ ἦν, 'exists and existed ever', or καὶ ὁποῖα ἦν καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἔστι καὶ ὁποῖα ἔσται, 'those (things) that existed, those that exist at present, and those that will exist'. Interestingly, we find similar formal devices in the last sentences of the Herodotean prologue: the repetition of the word ὁμοίως (our *Allbegriff* here), the recurrence of antithetical expressions ((ἄστεα) σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα), or the temporal antitheses (τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρὰ γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἐπ' ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά).

It seems that some formal devices of 'hymnal' or religious poetry help both authors to attain this σεμνότης, or 'solemnity' of style, which is particularly appropriate in wisdom literature. We will find this, for example, throughout the extant fragments of Heraclitus. True, for Anaxagoras, those formal devices serve to capture the infinite, un-mixed and self-ruled nature of the Mind and its greatest power, arranging the rotation of the elements of the Universe. Herodotus, on the other hand, propounds the idea of the mutability and instability of human affairs. But those differences on a 'doctrinal' level are much less important here than formal correspondences suggesting a common underlying tradition. By appropriating some characteristics of religious language, both authors adopt a quasi-religious stance; striving to establish a single universal vision of all things, both try to point to a fundamental unity of the world and/or of human experience.[84] In that, both visions can be subsumed under the formula of Heraclitus: ἓν πάντα (εἶναι) (*fr.* B 50 DK).[85]

Thus, the opening declaration to record 'the deeds of men' is by no means a capacious but meaningless formula easily encompassing the 'Protean shape' of the *Histories*. It becomes comprehensible as the carefully stated subject of the work resulting from the awareness of the underlying unity of all the variety of human affairs.[86] This awareness is the very wisdom of Herodotus, the most important title to his fame as a σοφός, and so it is presented in the very first

---

[80] Specific implications of this concept for the historical narrative of Hdt. deserve separate study (*cf.* n.14 above), but *cf.* already Corcella (1984), esp. 109-49, 186-219; R. Oswald, *GB* 21 (1995) 47-59; Harrison (2000), esp. 31-63.

[81] Fowler (1996) 86-7. Fowler suggests to me *per litteras* that [Hp.] *de Arte* 1 (= Littré 6.2.1-2) should be added to this list. *Cf.* Thomas (2000) 262-3 and, in general, 249-69.

[82] See also Thomas (2000) 153-61, 283-5 and *passim.* *Cf.* in general Lloyd (1987), esp. 83-102.

[83] K. Deichgräber, *Philologus* 88 (1933), esp. 250-3.

[84] For the possible link between the thought of Hdt. and that of Anaxag., see briefly Nestle (1940) 507. *Cf.* in general R. Seaford, 'Aeschylus and the unity of opposites', *JHS* 123 (2003), esp. 156-62.

[85] See further Heraclit. *fr.* B 41 DK. For the 'unity of the *physis*' in Hdt., see Corcella (1984), esp. 74-84; cf. *ibidem* 154-6, on the link between the overall vision of Hdt. and the idea of ἁρμονίη ἀφανής of Heraclit. (*fr.* B 54 DK). For the *incipit* of Hdt. and that of Heraclit., see L. Koenen, *ZPE* 97 (1993) 95-6.

[86] The modern reader may be struck by the apparent banality of Hdt.'s dictum, and hence be inclined to under-

sentence of the *Histories*.[87] Accordingly, his ἱστορίη of the origins (and hence nature) of the Greek–barbarian conflict seems but a fragment of a wider inquiry, namely that into the human condition in general.

From this perspective, I would tentatively conclude that Herodotus' project may well have been quite close to Thucydides' in that, by dismissing the mythical war *par excellence* to introduce his own authoritative opinion concerning the (relatively) recent past, he might have suggested that the 'truth about man',[88] and thus the 'paradigmatic' value of wisdom literature (be it poetry, philosophy, medicine, history, etc.), can only be achieved if founded on the firm ground of 'historical' times accessible to diverse tools of 'inquiry', namely in his narrative of a great recent war and its close antecedents. If so, what Thucydides did in his prologue was only radically to sharpen the standards discovered by Herodotus – both in his method of inquiry and in the temporal scope of his work.

V. CONCLUSIONS

To end my paper I shall resort to the principle of ring-composition, so dear to Herodotus, returning now to the Presocratics and to Isaiah Berlin's Tolstoy.

The ultimately 'monistic' vision of Herodotus' prologue is closely related to his rejection of the 'Persian tales' and the intellectual habits behind them, and to the implicit criticism of the 'factual' tendency in the *Weltanschauung* of some Greeks of the sixth and fifth century BC. From this standpoint, unexpectedly, Herodotus seems a perfect 'hedgehog' in Berlin's categorization – a hedgehog, moreover, well aware of his nature. However, it goes without saying that quite often in the *Histories*, this universal and monistic outlook is easily lost from sight. We cannot help admitting that Herodotus frequently concentrates on what is simply worth narrating, on 'things or objects devoid of deeper meaning, but interesting nonetheless and capable of provoking curiosity'.[89] Just consider how important the category of the 'marvellous', or θωυμαστόν, is for Herodotus – a category which is rightly considered by a number of critics to be a fundamental feature of his thought.[90] For this reason, among others, Herodotus has always been regarded as an exemplary 'fox', to resort once again to Berlin's classification.

We might of course account for this tension inherent in the *Histories* as a natural clash between theory and practice, or explain it in terms of the *Entwicklungsgeschichte* of the work. Assessing its internal incoherence in this way, we should come close to a typical conclusion of literary criticism regarding Tolstoy: 'It is fortunate for us that the author is a better artist than

rate its significance by regarding it as a traditional 'icing' on Herodotean narrative rather than a deeper philosophical (or religious) idea (in general, *cf.* the perspicacious remarks by Harrison (2000) 8-11). As a matter of fact, the idea of the instability of human affairs is neither banal nor a simple one. It has, on the one hand, countless parallels in the utterances of other Greek writers (and particularly poets) posing as wise men, so it was no doubt really wise for their intended public. On the other hand, this idea encompasses a whole set of political, psychological, physiological and even cosmological principles, distilled by Herodotus from all the variety of 'human affairs' he had gathered and analysed in the course of his 'inquiry'.

[87] At this juncture, I should perhaps add that Hdt.'s prologue (in which the author's most important principles are introduced in the drolly parodic abduction tales) suggests a good-humoured and humane thinker – unlike the majority of his severe (or even notoriously misanthropic; *cf.* below, n.98) fellow wise men. For 'egotism' and

'dogmatism' in early Greek thought, see Lloyd (1987), esp. 50-171.

[88] Hdt. 1.5.4 (τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὧν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην κτλ.) ~ Thuc. 1.22.4 (... καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι κτλ.). Note that the similar position of this passage in the prologue of Thucydides (a powerful coda) strongly suggests, once again, that he modelled his prologue on that of Hdt. *Cf.* above, n.20, and see further below, p. 162 (with n.114).

[89] I quote Bravo (2001) 85, summarized above, p. 144.

[90] See, e.g., Drexler (1972) 28-57; Hartog (1991), esp. 243-9. *Cf.* also H. Immerwahr, *AJP* 61 (1960) 261-90; H. Barth, *Klio* 50 (1968) 93-110; Ch. Hunzinger, *Ktéma* 20 (1995) 47-70; Thomas (2000), esp. 134-67 (Herodotean 'wonders' in their contemporary intellectual context); for a general reappraisal of the 'marvellous' in Hdt., Munson (2001) *passim* and esp. ch.4.

thinker.'[91] I would prefer another explanation; all the more so because, as I hope I have established above, Herodotus was able to present his attitude in a very coherent way. To explain this paradoxical tension, then, we need for the last time to catch a glimpse of the wider context of Herodotus' intellectual achievement.

At the very beginning of my paper I suggested that among the Presocratics there existed a debate between the exponents of two diametrically opposite modes of thinking. A fierce quarrel between, to put it briefly, σοφίη and πολυμαθίη, seems to have continued until the formative years of Plato's thought, but in view of the usage of the term πολυμάθεια in Aristotle,[92] it appears to have ended quite soon afterwards. In both Plato and Xenophon, Socrates becomes a valiant champion of φιλοσοφία against different representatives of πολυμαθία. Most revealing here is a passage from a discussion between Socrates and Hippias (Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.6; trans. J.S. Watson):

> 'Are you still saying the same things, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?' 'Yes,' said Socrates, 'and what is more wonderful, I am not only still saying the same things, but am saying them on the same subjects (οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν); but you, perhaps, from being possessed of such variety of knowledge, never say the same things on the same subjects' (σὺ δ' ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυμαθῆς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις). 'Certainly,' replied Hippias, 'I do always try to say something new' (πειρῶμαι καινόν τι λέγειν ἀεί).

Here, an exemplary polymath[93] opposes his manifold interests, his wide learning and his love of novelty to the 'monistic' thought and method of Socrates. In Plato's *Alcibiades II* (147a), πολυμαθία and πολυτεχνία, or 'skill in many arts', are carefully distinguished from ἐπιστήμη, or real knowledge. The problem of the relationship between φιλοσοφία and πολυμαθία recurs several times in the spurious Platonic *Lovers* (133c, 137b, 139a). Eventually, in his late *Laws*, Plato stigmatizes the influence exercised by poets on young minds. The acquaintance with poets of all kind can result in πολυμαθία (811a-b), which, along with πολυπειρία, or 'great experience', can be more dangerous than ignorance, if directed towards a bad end (819a). Hence the need for a well-organized system of education in the city of the Magnetes.[94]

Our evidence shows that πολυμαθία as a derogatory term can be attributed to the results of familiarity with various types of poetry[95] or with the teaching of the sophists, to the effects of bad education or to personal experience of different sorts.[96] I think that we can partly explain this peculiarly heated discussion surrounding πολυμαθία. The foregoing passages, along with the fragments of Heraclitus and Democritus quoted at the beginning of this paper, seem to suggest that in the troubled intellectual world of late sixth- and fifth-century Greece, when new non-traditional types of wisdom were starting to flourish against the background of the intellectual world of the ancestors, some Greeks became aware of profound differences between various branches of wisdom and knowledge. From Heraclitus onwards, emerging philosophy (in the pre-Platonic meaning of the term) had on the one hand to assert its special worth against the tradition of poetic wisdom,[97] and on the other to defend its exceptional status against the new,

---

[91] Thus Nikolai Akhsharumov, a Soviet critic quoted by Berlin (1966) 7.

[92] In Aristotle, an arch-polymath (*cf.*, e.g., Ath. 9.398e), this word appears only once (*fr.* 62 Rose[3], above, n.6) and seems to be a neutral term for 'erudition', deprived of the derogatory overtones of earlier times (see above, nn.2-6). This is the most popular meaning of πολυμαθία (or πολυμάθεια) later on in Greek literature.

[93] See also his *fr.* 86 B 6 DK. *Cf.* the famous notion of αὐτάρκεια in his characterization in the *Suda* (*s.v.* Ἱππίας).

[94] In general, Plato's language in all these cases strongly resembles that of a well-known passage of the *Phaedrus* (275a-b).

[95] In Ar. *Vesp.* 1175-6, πολυμαθία is the sympotic (literary) dexterity *par excellence*.

[96] To characterize it Plato quotes the *Margites*: unlike true philosophers, the exponents of πολυμαθία 'know many things, but all of them so very badly' (*Alcib. II* 147 b).

[97] For this tradition, see already P. Friedländer, *Hermes* 48 (1913) 558-616. *Cf.* Raaflaub (2002) 180-1.

'display-oriented' and agonistic culture of the sophistic era. Both adverse camps could be stigmatized using the label of πολυμαθία.[98] Conversely, some exponents of πολυμαθία would no doubt have been proud of this appellation,[99] parading, as Hippias did, the exceptional variety of their knowledge and teaching.

For our understanding of Herodotus, a very peculiar case of non-traditional, 'display-oriented' πολυμαθία can be revealing. In another debate between Hippias and Socrates, this time drawn from Plato (*Hp. Mai.* 285d-e (= *FGrHist* 6 T 3); trans. H.N. Fowler, modified), Hippias says that the Lacedaemonians 'like to listen to and applaud (ἐπαινοῦσιν)' his pieces 'about the genealogies of heroes and men' and 'the foundations of cities in ancient times'. In short, 'they are very fond of hearing about antiquity in general (πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας)'. Thus, even the grave Lacedaemonians are especially interested in public display-pieces on these various antiquarian matters.

Another privileged sphere of popular interest can be observed in a highly dubious fragment of Democritus,[100] namely the fragment B 299 DK (= *FGrHist* 263 F 1). In Book 1 of his *Stromata* (69.4), Clement of Alexandria quotes a passage attributed to the prologue (*cf.* τάδε λέγει Δημόκριτος) of an unknown work of Democritus, adding that these words testify to the pride in his πολυμαθία: 'I wandered over more extensive territory (γῆν πλείστην ἐπλανησάμην) than any other man in my time, making the most extensive investigations (ἱστορέων τὰ μήκιστα), and saw more climes and countries (ἀέρας τε καὶ γέας πλείστας εἶδον) and listened to more men of wisdom (λογίων ἀνθρώπων πλείστων ἐσήκουσα), etc.' (trans. R. Thomas, modified). Strikingly, this is precisely what Herodotus might have claimed for his work.

It is no mere coincidence that Clement qualifies the attitude of his 'Democritus' as πολυμαθία. Even granted that this fragment is in fact a relatively late fabrication, the whole set of claims just quoted forms a deep-seated commonplace of ethnographic and geographic literature. Just as Hecataeus (*FGrHist* 1 T 12a) was called a 'far-wandering man' (ἀνὴρ πολυπλανής),[101] he could also be numbered by Heraclitus among the exponents of πολυμαθία (22 B 40 DK (= *FGrHist* 1 T 21)). In his paraphrase of a lost passage by Diodorus, Photius (*Bibl.* cod. 70, 35 a 22) cites Diodorus' claim to a thirty-year period of laborious research, including visiting a number of countries 'for the sake of πολυμαθία'. I think we can assume that Diodorus followed here quite closely earlier *topoi* of the periegetic genre.

All in all, then, it seems probable that in fifth-century Greece, both branches of intellectual activity enthusiastically pursued by 'Herodotus' contemporaries', namely (to put it briefly) ἀρχαιολογία (including mythography, genealogy, etc.) and περιήγησις, were widely considered

---

[98] See, e.g., Heraclit. 22 B 40 DK, hammering at random Hesiod, Xenophanes, Pythagoras and Hecataeus. Of course, owing to the well-known standards of ancient polemics, one could easily set upon a thinker whose general attitude was not so different from one's own. This was especially the case of the famously misanthropic Heraclitus (see *frr.* B 35, 40, and 129 DK), for whom physics is not so very remote from ethics. Incidentally, it is very tempting to relate his 'monistic' view of the world (e.g. *fr.* B 50) and his criticism of πολυμαθίη (*cf.* above, p. 144) to his *fr.* B 29 (αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἓν ἀντὶ ἁπάντων οἱ ἄριστοι κτλ.) and esp. to *fr.* B 104 DK (τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν κτλ.), where we find 'popular bards' and 'the mob as a teacher' (*cf.* already Lloyd (1987) 86). *Cf.* also Pl. *Rep.* 479a.

[99] For this positive aspect of πολυμαθία, see the testimonies mentioned above, nn.2, 4, 5. We can be sure that πολυμαθία might well be a laudatory term at the time, since otherwise the origins of the unanimously positive meaning of the term after Aristotle (above, n.92),

strongly contradicting the Platonic and the Xenophontean (negative) one, would be unexplained. I would tentatively suggest that the positive meaning of πολυμαθία was the original one, preceding the 'monistic' claims of some early philosophers. *Cf.* also Gladigow (1965) 22 n.4.

[100] *Cf.* especially the remarks *ad loc.* by H. Diels ('unechte Fragmente', 299 DK), and by F. Jacoby (*FGrHist* 263 F 1). Guthrie (1962-69) 2.387 (with n.1) seems to be prepared to admit the authenticity of the fragment, but does not reveal his reasons for doing so. I wish to thank here Prof. Jørgen Mejer for the possibility of briefly discussing with him the problem of the authenticity of this fragment.

[101] I do not share the scepticism of S. West, *JHS* 111 (1991), esp. 152 (with n.46), about the travels of Hecataeus (*contra*: Jacoby (1912) 2688-90); but that aside, for my argument here it is enough to assume a fifth-century origin for the Greek tradition claiming that Hecat. travelled extensively.

model cases of πολυμαθία[102] and as such could be polemically opposed to the σοφία or φιλοσοφία of other thinkers and writers.

<div align="center">*</div>

In his book on Tolstoy, which provided me with the ἀφορμαί for the present paper, Isaiah Berlin points out how difficult it is to define the nature of this writer with reference to the otherwise useful categories of 'foxes' and 'hedgehogs'. He explains that 'Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog' (3-4). Berlin tries to describe this peculiar tension as follows: Tolstoy 'perceived reality in its multiplicity, as a collection of separate entities round and into which he saw with a clarity and penetration scarcely ever equalled', yet 'what he believed in was the opposite. He advocated a single embracing vision' (39-40) and 'longed for a universal explanatory principle' (37). Finally, Berlin attempts to understand Tolstoy's special case in the context of the 'old quarrel' between two 'rival types of knowledge – that which results from methodical inquiry, and the more impalpable kind that consists in the "sense of reality", in "wisdom"' (77).

Now, I think that Berlin's characterization of Tolstoy can prove useful for our understanding of Herodotus. Both thinkers share an important feature of 'sharp-sighted foxes' of all times, namely a repugnance for metaphysical speculation in general,[103] and mistrust in the face of untestable theories, 'a hostile attitude to theorizing without evidence or test, to explanations by the miraculous, and to accounts not based on careful and sustained observation'. As a matter of fact, the above-quoted words of Donald Lateiner ((1986) 3) concern what he calls 'a shared epistemological response' of Herodotus and his contemporary medical writers (especially those of the *Ancient Medicine, Nature of Man*, and *Regimen 1* (pp. 4-6)) to some theories of teachers and philosophers of sixth-century Ionia and late fifth-century Athens.[104] Instead, both medical writers and Herodotus strongly rely on 'the older, less specialized sense of science: knowledge gained through experience'.[105] That is why Herodotus is so deeply concerned about epistemology and reliable methods of acquiring knowledge.[106]

But all this is just one side of Herodotus' mind. The idea of gaining ἐπιστήμη through experience leads him in a direction rather unacceptable to his contemporary medical writers. Instead of starting 'from the particular', as they advise, he does just the opposite, thus becoming a 'justified target' of the criticism directed by the author of the *Ancient Medicine* (20.1-3; trans. W.H.S. Jones) towards theorizing 'physicians and philosophers (ἰητροὶ καὶ σοφισταί)', who assert 'that nobody can know medicine who is ignorant of what man is' (ὅστις μὴ οἶδεν ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος).[107] As we have seen above, in his opening declarations Herodotus claims to be a σοφός capable of encompassing the whole range of 'human affairs' at a glance, aware of the very essence of the 'εὐδαιμονίη of men'.[108] Thus, just like some of his contemporaries and prede-

---

[102] The 'polymath dimension' of those genres can be further confirmed by their general assessment in Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 5.1-3 Aujac. In general, *cf.* Fowler (1996) 62-9.

[103] For Herodotus' lack of interest in metaphysical speculation, *cf.* in general Nestle (1940) 505, and recently Raaflaub (2002) 156 n.27. It should be stressed that what Hdt. dislikes is the *speculation* about the divine and not the belief in the possibility of divine intervention in human affairs, or the belief in the divine causation in the history (*cf.* Harrison (2000) *passim*). Quite understandably, this very belief prevents him from excessive speculation here.

[104] Just consider how ruthlessly Hdt. dismisses the 'symmetrizing' speculation about the shape of the world (see, notoriously, 4.36.1-2; note that Hdt. 2.33.2-34.1, plainly contradicting his own view, is interpolated, as Bravo (2000) 57-9 and 112 has recently shown).

[105] Lateiner (1986) 2. For the opposite attitude (knowledge based on *a priori*, deductive, systematic and 'schematizing' speculation), characteristic of the Presocratics, see Müller (1981), esp. 299-302. See, however, Thomas (2000) 171-3, for Hdt.'s alleged 'empiricism' (*cf.* Corcella (1984) 63-102).

[106] See, e.g., Müller (1981); Lateiner (1986) and (1989) 57-108; Thomas (2000) 168-212; Raaflaub (2002), esp. 158-9.

[107] For other attacks of medical writers on 'monistic thinkers' (*cf.* esp. [Hippoc.] *VM* 1.1 (= Littré 1.570.1-6), and *Nat. Hom.* 1.2 (= *CMG* 1.1.3.164.9-14)), see Thomas (2000) 155-6. But *cf.* Lloyd (1987) 118-20 (with n.43). On the relationship between Hdt. and contemporary medical writings, see now Thomas (2000) *passim*.

[108] I disagree with D. Lateiner (*cf.* esp. Lateiner (1986) 14-18) only in considering that Hdt.'s occasional

cessors among the Presocratics, but using different methods, he aims at a single monumental vision or ἓν μέγα. Furthermore, the pride he takes in the 'display of his inquiry' makes me think that he represented his knowledge – based on solid and comprehensive research instead of *a priori* speculation – as much better than that of his rivals.

With this internally split literary *persona* of 'Herodotus the σοφός', we can compare Herodotus' Solon, the only sage in the *Histories* who is incontestably wise and who is always right.[109] He plays the role of Herodotus' *alter ego* in that he is a wandering σοφός who undertakes his extensive travels (1.29.1-30.2) 'for the sake of seeing' (or 'visiting': θεωρίης εἵνεκεν), and ultimately 'for the sake of wisdom' (σοφίης εἵνεκεν).[110] Solon's ἐπιστήμη is precisely the Berlinian 'sense of reality' or 'wisdom'; he obviously knows ἓν μέγα, and his teaching concerning the precariousness of human affairs becomes the key theme of Herodotus' work.[111] Unlike his fellow wandering σοφισταί,[112] his travels do not make him a 'polymath', but an arch-hedgehog, the implicit model for Herodotus' own achievement.

To describe the very peculiar case of Herodotus, let me quote for the last time Sir Isaiah Berlin on Tolstoy. The 'emotional cause' of Herodotus' work seems again to be this 'passionate desire for a monistic vision of life on the part of a fox bitterly intent upon seeing it in the manner of a hedgehog' (75).[113] Just as in the case of Berlin's Tolstoy, this internal tension or even fracture in Herodotus' mind should be seen in the context of the well-articulated debate between the 'hedgehogs' and the 'foxes' of his time, say, between σοφοί and πολυμαθεῖς. The ambition of Herodotus – in order to surpass his contemporaries from both camps – was perhaps to apply the 'monistic' vision of the former to the subject-matter traditionally linked with the 'pluralistic' attitude of the latter, and hence (at least partly) our paradox. A true 'hedgehog', Thucydides, was needed in order successfully to resolve this tension. But let us not forget that, first, it was Herodotus who paved the way for him, showing that regularities of human nature can be demonstrated by using a massive amount of historical *exempla* (such as great wars; *cf.* above, p. 158). Secondly, the success of Thucydides was a relative one, since his successors were obviously unable to grasp his unique synthesis of 'wisdom' and history.[114] But that is another story.

MAREK WĘCOWSKI
Warsaw University

departures from empiricist principles result from his inability consistently to apply them. (For the failure to follow one's own theoretical principles in ancient Greek science, including those stated through the criticism of one's rivals, *cf.* a number of works by G.E.R. Lloyd, e.g. (1987) *passim*). In my view, there is a much deeper internal tension or discontinuity in Hdt.'s thought (*cf.* below).

[109] He eludes the distressing pattern of 'wise advisers' illustrating by their not quite successful counsels the limitations of human calculation (see Pelling (1991) *passim*). It is also worth noting that, unlike other 'wise advisers' in the *Histories*, the display of Solon's wisdom never concerns a particular case or problem, but 'human nature' in general.

[110] See in particular the words of Croesus to Solon: παρ' ἡμέας γὰρ περὶ σέο λόγος ἀπῖκται πολλὸς καὶ σοφίης εἵνεκεν τῆς σῆς καὶ πλάνης, ὡς φιλοσοφέων γῆν πολλὴν θεωρίης εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας (1.30.2) and the narrator's remarks on Anacharsis (4.76.2; *cf.* 4.76.6). *Cf.*, e.g., Drexler (1972) 25-7; J. Redfield, *CPh* 80 (1985), esp. 98-9 and *passim*; see also Cobet (1971) 182-3, and important remarks by Corcella (1984) 154-6 on the σοφίη of Solon.

[111] See esp. 1.86.5-7 as well as 1.32.1 and 4 *ad fin.*, where some intriguing verbal echoes of 1.5.4 can be heard (ἐπιστάμενόν με τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες ἐπειρωτᾶις ἀνθρωπηίων πρηγμάτων πέρι ... πᾶν ἐστι ἄνθρωπος συμφορή; *cf.* 3.40.2 (the sage Amasis) and 7.18.2-3 (Artabanus); *cf.* also above, nn.78, 79).

[112] *Cf.* Hdt. 1.29.1 for ἄλλοι ... σοφισταί (i.e. σοφοί) travelling to Sardis. Implicitly, none of them could match Solon and his wisdom. For Herodotus' Sardis as a sort of prefiguration of Periclean Athens, see, e.g., Moles (1996), esp. 267-9; *cf.* Raaflaub (1987) 236 n.40; T.F. Scanlon, *Historia* 43 (1994) 145-56 and 159-64.

[113] *Cf.* one of the concluding remarks of Munson (2001) ('[Hdt.] is comfortable with the fragmented diversity of the world', 272) and her observations on 'the cooperation between a relativistic ethnographer, who interprets little and evaluates cautiously, and an absolutist historian, who explains historical action in moral terms' (18). *Cf.* also, from another standpoint, Cobet (2002) 412.

[114] See, notoriously, Arist. *Pol.* 1451 b 11, a reaction typical, I would argue (*cf.* above, n.14), of the reader of Greek historiography from Xenophon onwards.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Asheri, D. (1991) *Erodoto. Le Storie* 1, ed. D. Asheri and V. Antelami (3rd edn, Milan)

Bakker, E.J. (2002) 'The making of history: Herodotus' *historiēs apodexis*', in Bakker *et al.* (eds) (2002) 3-32

—, de Jong, I.J.F. and Van Wees, H. (eds) (2002) *Brill's Companion to Herodotus* (Leiden, Boston and Cologne)

Berlin, I. (1966) *The Hedgehog and the Fox. An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History* (2nd edn, New York)

Bertelli, L. (2001) 'Hecataeus: from genealogy to historiography', in Luraghi (ed.) (2001) 67-94

Boedeker, D. (2000) 'Herodotus's genre(s)', in M. Depew and D. Obbink (eds), *Matrices of Genre. Authors, Canons, and Society* (Cambridge, MA and London) 97-114

— and Peradotto, J. (eds) (1987) *Herodotus and the Invention of History* (*Arethusa* 20.1-2)

Bornitz, H.-F. (1968) *Herodot-Studien. Beiträge zur Verständnis der Einheit des Geschichtswerks* (Berlin)

Bowie, A.M. (1993) 'Homer, Herodotus and the 'beginnings' of Thucydides' *History*', in H.D. Jocelyn and H. Hurt (eds), *Tria Lustra. Essays and Notes Presented to John Pinsent ...* (Liverpool) 141-7

Bravo, B. (2000) 'Pseudo-Herodotus and Pseudo-Thucydides on Scythia, Thrace and the regions "beyond"', *ASNP* 5.1/4, 21-112

— (2001) 'Un frammento della *Piccola Iliade* (*P. Oxy.* 2510), lo stile narrativo tardo-arcaico, i racconti su Achille immortale', *QUCC* 67, 49-114

Cartledge, P. (2001) *Spartan Reflexions* (London)

Cobet, J. (1971) *Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes* (*Historia* Einzelschrift 17, Wiesbaden)

— (2002) 'The organization of time in the *Histories*', in Bakker *et al.* (eds) (2002) 387-412

Corcella, A. (1984) *Erodoto e l'analogia* (Palermo)

Darbo-Peschanski, C. (1987) *Le discours du particulier. Essai sur l'enquête hérodotéenne* (Paris)

Dewald, C. (1999) 'The figured stage: focalizing the initial narratives of Herodotus and Thucydides', in T.M. Falkner, N. Felson, D. Konstan (eds), *Contextualizing Classics. Essays in Honor of John J. Peradotto* (Lanham) 221-52

Dorati, M. (2000) *Le Storie di Erodoto: Etnografia e racconto* (Pisa and Rome)

Drews, R. (1973) *The Greek Accounts of Eastern History* (Washington, DC and Cambridge, MA)

Drexler, H. (1972) *Herodot-Studien* (Hildesheim and New York)

Erbse, H. (1956) 'Der erste Satz im Werke Herodots', in *Festschrift Bruno Snell ...* (Munich) 209-22

— (1992) *Studien zum Verständnis Herodots* (Berlin and New York)

Fehling, D. (1975) 'Zur Funktion und Formengeschichte des Proömiums in der älteren griechischen Prosa', in *ΔΩPHMA. Hans Diller zum 70. Geburtstag ...* (Athens) 61-75

— (1989) *Herodotus and his 'Sources'. Citation, Invention and Narrative Art* (trans. J.G. Howie) (Leeds)

Fornara, C.W. (1971) *Herodotus. An Interpretative Essay* (Oxford)

Fowler, R.L. (1996) 'Herodotos and his contemporaries', *JHS* 116, 62-87

— (2001) 'Early *Historiē* and literacy', in Luraghi (ed.) (2001) 95-115

— (2003), 'Herodotos and Athens', in P. Derow and R. Parker (eds), *Herodotus and his World. Essays from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest* (Oxford) 305-18

Fritz, K. von (1967) *Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung* 1.1-2: *Von den Anfängen bis Thukydides* (Berlin)

Gladigow, B. (1965) *Sophia und Kosmos. Untersuchungen zur Frühgeschichte von σοφός und σοφίη* (Hildesheim)

Guthrie, W.K.C. (1962-9) *A History of Greek Philosophy* (6 vols, Cambridge)

Harrison, T. (2000) *Divinity and History. The Religion of Herodotus* (Oxford)

Hartog, F. (1991) *Le miroir d'Hérodote. Essai sur la représentation de l'autre* (2nd edn, Paris)

Hommel, H. (1981) 'Herodots Einleitungssatz: ein Schlüssel zur Analyse des Gesamtwerks?', in Kurz *et al.* (eds) (1981) 271-87

Hornblower, S. (1996) *A Commentary on Thucydides* 2: *Books IV-V.24* (Oxford)

Howald, E. (1944) *Vom Geist antiker Geschichtsschreibung* (Munich and Berlin)

Huber, L. (1965) 'Herodots Homerverständnis', in H. Flashar and K. Gaiser (eds), *Synusia. Festgabe für Wolfgang Schadewaldt* (Pfullingen) 29-52

Hunter, V. (1982) *Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides* (Princeton)

Immerwahr, H.R. (1966) *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland, OH)

Jacoby, F. (1912) 'Hekataios', *RE* 7.2666-769

— (1913) 'Herodotos', *RE* Suppl. 2. 205-520

— (1949) *Atthis. The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford)

Krischer, T. (1965) 'Herodots Prooimion', *Hermes* 93, 159-67

Kurz, G., Müller, D. and Nicolai, W. (eds) (1981) *Gnomosyne ... Festschrift für Walter Marg zum 70. Geburtstag* (Munich)

Lateiner, D. (1986) 'The empirical element in the methods of early Greek medical writers and Herodotus: a shared epistemological response', *Antichthon* 20, 1-20

— (1989) *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Toronto)

Lewis, D.M. (1985) 'Persians in Herodotus', in *The Greek Historians: Literature and History. Papers Presented to A.E. Raubitschek* (Saratoga, CA) 101-17

Lloyd, G.E.R. (1987) *The Revolutions of Wisdom. Studies in Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science* (Berkeley)

Luraghi, N. (2001), 'Local knowledge in Herodotus' *Histories*', in Luraghi (ed.) (2001) 138-60

— (ed.) (2001) *The Historian's Craft in the Age of Herodotus* (Oxford)

Marg, W. (ed.) (1962) *Herodot. Eine Auswahl aus der neueren Forschung* (Darmstadt)

Marincola, J. (1997) *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography* (Cambridge)

Millender, E. (1999) 'Athenian ideology and the empowered Spartan woman', in S. Hodkinson and A. Powell (eds), *Sparta. New Perspectives* (London) 355-91

Moles, J.L. (1993) 'Truth and untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides', in C. Gill and T.P. Wiseman (eds), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World* (Exeter) 88-121

— (1996) 'Herodotus warns the Athenians', in F. Cairns and M. Heath (eds), *Roman Poetry and Prose, Greek Poetry, Etymology, Historiography* (Leeds) 259-84

— (2002) 'Herodotus and Athens', in Bakker *et al.* (eds) (2002) 33-52

Müller, D. (1981) 'Herodot – Vater des Empirismus? Mensch und Erkenntnis im Denken Herodots', in Kurz *et al.* (eds) (1981) 299-318

Munson, R.V. (2001) *Telling Wonders. Ethnographic and Political Discourse in the Work of Herodotus* (Ann Arbor)

Murray, O. (2001) 'Herodotus and oral history', in Luraghi (ed.) (2001) 16-44

Myres, J.L. (1953) *Herodotus. Father of History* (Oxford)

Nagy, G. (1987) 'Herodotus the *logios*', in Boedeker and Peradotto (eds) (1987) 175-84

— (1990) *Pindar's Homer. The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past* (Baltimore and London)

Nestle, W. (1940) *Vom Mythos zum Logos* (Stuttgart)

Pagel, K.-A. (1927) *Die Bedeutung des aitiologischen Momentes für Herodots Geschichtsschreibung* (Borna and Leipzig)

Pelliccia, H. (1992) 'Sappho 16, Gorgias' *Helen*, and the preface to Herodotus' *Histories*', *YCS* 29, 63-84

Pelling, C.B.R. (1991) 'Thucydides' Archidamus and Herodotus' Artabanus', in M.A. Flower and M. Toher (eds), *Georgica. Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell* (London) 120-42

— (2000) *Literary Texts and the Greek Historian* (London and New York)

Pohlenz, M. (1937) *Herodot. Der erste Geschichtschreiber des Abendlandes* (Leipzig and Berlin)

Porciani, L. (1997) *La forma proemiale. Storiografia e pubblico nel mondo antico* (Pisa)

Raaflaub, K.A. (1987) 'Herodotus, political thought, and the meaning of history', in Boedeker and Peradotto (eds) (1987) 221-48

— (2002) 'Philosophy, science, politics: Herodotus and the intellectual trends of his time', in Bakker *et al.* (eds) (2002) 149-86

Rösler, W. (2002) 'The *Histories* and Writing', in Bakker *et al.* (eds) (2002) 79-94

Romilly, J. de (1975) 'Cycles et cercles chez les auteurs grecs de l'époque classique', in J. Bingen, G. Cambier and G. Nachtergael (eds), *Le monde grec ... Hommages à Claire Préaux* (Brussels) 140-52

Schadewaldt, W. (1962) 'Das Religiös-humane als Grundlage der geschichtlichen Obiektivität bei Herodot', in Marg (ed.) (1962) 185-201

Shrimpton, G.S. (1997) *History and Memory in Ancient Greece* (Montreal and Kingston)

Snell, B. (1924) *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie* (σοφία, γνώμη, σύνεσις, ἱστορία, μάθημα, ἐπιστήμη) (Berlin)

Strasburger, H. (1972) *Homer und die Geschichtsschreibung* (Heidelberg)

Thomas, R. (2000) *Herodotus in Context. Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion* (Cambridge)

— (2001) 'Herodotus' *Histories* and the floating gap', in Luraghi (ed.) (2001) 198-210.

Vannicelli, P. (2001) 'Herodotus' Egypt and the foundation of universal history', in Luraghi (ed.) (2001) 211-40

Van Wees, H. (2002) 'Herodotus and the past', in Bakker *et al.* (eds) (2002) 321-49

West, S.R. (2002) *Demythologisation in Herodotus* (*Xenia Toruniensia* 6, Toruń)